Golden Gate University Law Review
Volume 13
Issue 1 Ninth Circuit Survey

Article 14

January 1983

Indian Law
Mark R. Peterson
May Lee Tong

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev
Part of the Indian and Aboriginal Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Mark R. Peterson and May Lee Tong, Indian Law, 13 Golden Gate U. L. Rev. (1983).
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol13/iss1/14

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Academic Journals at GGU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Golden Gate University Law Review by an authorized administrator of GGU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
jfischer@ggu.edu.

Peterson and Tong: Indian Law

INDIAN LAW
NORTHERN CHEYENNE TRIBE V. ADSIT: ARE STATE
JURISDICTIONAL DISCLAIMERS STILL THE INDIAN'S
ASSURANCE OF FEDERAL JURISDICTION?

A.

INTRODUCTION

In Northern Cheyenne Tribe v. Adsit,1 the Ninth Circuit
held that Montana'sll failure to repeal disclaimers of jurisdiction
over Indian lands contained in the state's constitution and enabling act barred it from assuming jurisdiction over these lands. 3
The lower court4 had relied on the Supreme Court's decision in
Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United States,"
(commonly referred to as Akin),' to hold that the McCarran
amendment? granted jurisdiction to state courts to determine
water rights within their borders. Reversing, the Ninth Circuit
held8 that Montana's litigation did not involve factors establishing the exceptional circumstances· which would justify dismissal
of a federal action in favor of state jurisdiction in a water rights
1. 668 F.2d lOBO (9th Cir.) (per Ferguson, J.; the other panel memben were Choy, J.
and Merrill, J., dissenting), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 50 (1982).
2. The Adsit case was consolidated with the following cases: San Carlos Apache
Tribe v. State of Arizona, 668 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir.), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 50 (1982),
and Navajo Nation v. United States, 668 F.2d 1100 (9th Cir.), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 50
(1982). The issue in all three cases was that of determining the proper forum for adjudication of the Indians' reserved water rights. The Adsit case originated in Montana; both
the San Carlos and the Navajo Nation cases originated in Arizona.
3. 668 F.2d at 1087. The disclaimer provision is found at MONT. CONST. art. I. The
enabling act was approved by Congress at 25 Stat. 676 (1889). For a discussion of the
disclaimer, see infra note 37 and accompanying text.
4. Northern Cheyenne Tribe v. Tongue River Water Usen, 484 F. Supp. 31 (D.C.
Mont. 1979).
5. 424 U.S. 800 (1976).
6. Colorado River Water Conservation District was decidedoconcurrently with Akin
v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976).
.
7. 43 U.S.C. § 666 (1976). See infra note 33 for text.
8. The Ninth Circuit fint determined that Akin and the McCarran amendment did
not act to repeal disclaimers of jurisdiction over Indian lands. Therefore, the court's entire discussion of the facton establishing the exceptional circumstances in Akin is
dictum.
9. 668 F.2d at 1090. For a discussion of the exceptional circumstances, see infra note
44.

329

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1983

1

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 13, Iss. 1 [1983], Art. 14

330 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 13:329

controversy. Furthermore, the court took the opportunity to apply a narrow interpretation of the exceptional circumstances factors established in Akin.lo The Ninth Circuit's holding in Adsit
is in direct conflict with the recent Tenth Circuit decision in Jicarilla Apache Tribe u. United States. l l
B.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In 1975, the Indian tribes 12 sued in federal district court to
adjudicate water rights 18 of Montana's Tongue River and Rosebud Creek. 14 Subsequently, the United States brought two
suits 111 for the same purpose in its fiduciary capacity as trustee
for the Indian tribes. The defendant state agency and individuals le then brought suit in state court for a determination of all
existing rights to the Tongue River and Rosebud Creek. The district court consolidated the federal cases and stayed proceedings
pending the outcome of the Supreme Court's decision in the factually similar Akin case. Akin was decided in 1976.
In May, 1979, Montana enacted a state water consolidation
plan. 17 The district court found that the state litigation, coupled
10. See infra note 44.
11. 601 F.2d 1116 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 995 (1979).
12. The plaintiffs included the Northern Cheyenne tribe and several other reservation tribes.
13. The specific water rights issue was to determine the quantity that should be
allocated to the Indians. In the landmark case of Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564
(1908), the Supreme Court held that there is an implied reservation of water sufficient to
sustain the tribal existence. The exact quantity of water reserved was not determined by
Winters. For a discussion of how the Winters rights allocations conflict with state water
allocations, see infra notes 23-26 and accompanying text.
14. Jurisdiction was alleged under 28 U.S.C. § 1362 (1976), which provides: "The
district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions, brought by any Indian
tribe ... wherein the matter in controversy arises under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States."
15. Jurisdiction was alleged under 28 U.S.C. § 1345 (1976) which provides that
"[Tlhe district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions, or proceedings
commenced by the United States, or by any agency or officer thereof .... " Traditionally, Indian water rights have been reserved in trust to the federal government. Winters
v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908). It is out of this trust relationship that the United
States brought suit as a fiduciary for the Indians.
16. The defendants included the Montana Department of Natural Resources and
other individuals and corporations who claimed water rights under differing legal theories. In all, there were nearly 9,000 defendants. See Northern Cheyenne Tribe v. Tongue
River Water Users, 484 F. Supp. 31, 36 (D.C. Mont. 1979).
17. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 85-2-211-85-2-243 (1979). The enactment of this bill was
undoubtedly an attempt to fall within the purview of Akin.
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with the comprehensive water plan, was similar to and therefore
controlled by Akin.18 Thereafter, the district court determined
that the factors in Akin favoring state jurisdiction were present
in the Adsit case. IS Consequently, the district court dismissed all
pending federal actions as an exercise of "wise judicial administration"20 as provided for by Akin.21 Plaintiff Indian tribes and
the United States appealed the finding of state jurisdiction.

C.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

Judicial doctrines to resolve jurisdictional questions over
reservation Indians involve much complexity, contradiction, and
ambiguity. Unraveling the complex jurisdictional issues
presented in Adsit requires an analysis of state jurisdictional
disclaimers, pertinent legislative enactments and related Supreme Court decisions. Furthermore, sensitive state interests22
must be integrated into the judicial analysis.
Development of the Federal-State Relationship of Western
Water Law

During the nineteenth century the arid West developed the
doctrine of prior appropriation to govern water rights. The prior
appropriation system favors users who first divert water for beneficial use, regardless of proximity to the stream. iS In 1877, Congress passed the Desert Land Act,lIf making state law the exclu18. 484 F. Supp. at 36.

19.Id.
20. For a discussion of "wise judicial administration," see infra note 43.
21. 484 F. Supp. at 36.
22. There are several state interests which must be considered. First, recognition of

federally reserved water rights restricts the exercise of state sovereignty and in some
instances preempts provisions of state constitutions or statutes. Second, the rights interfere with efficient operation of the state prior appropriation system. This occurs because
federally reserved water rights are withdrawn from public domain without consideration
of prior use. This disruption of the state's water allocation scheme is particularly disturbing to the western states where water is scarce. The conflict arises since the states
would like to manage water use to the benefit of their own citizens and to their economic
advantage. For an excellent survey of the multi-faceted federal-state relationship in
western water law, see 2 R. CLARK, WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS §§ 100.1-107.3 (1967)
[hereinafter R. CLARK.); H08ktyk, Who Controls the Water? The Emerging Balance
Among Federal, State, and Indian Jurisdictional Claims and its Impact on Energy Development in the Upper Colorado and Upper Missouri River Basins, 18 Tulsa L.J. 1
(1982).

23. See R. CLARK, supra note 22, at §§ 4.1-2.
24. Act of Mar. 3, 1877, ch. 107, 19 Stat. 377 (current version at 43 U.S.C. §§ 321339 (1976».
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sive source for obtaining appropriate water rights on public
lands.
Disputes often arise when the federal government and states
disagree about the management of federally reserved water
rights. In Winters v. United States,20 the Supreme Court upheld
federal claims to reserved water rights and tacitly acknowledged
a continuing federal interest in unappropriated waters. This judicial vindication of federal claims has been a source of substantial frustration to the states since it interferes with the prior appropriation system. 26
State Jurisdictional Disclaimers
In 1887, Montana was admitted to statehood on condition
that it disclaim all rights and titles to jurisdiction over Indian
land.27 The disclaimer in the enabling act was reinforced by a
disclaimer of jurisdiction in Montana's constitution. 28
Originally, states with jurisdictional disclaimers were powerless to adjudicate claims involving any Indian rights or titles. 29
Recently, the trend has been to allow states greater authority in
adjudicating Indian rights claims. so In White Mountain Apache
Tribe v. Arizona, the Ninth Circuit held that a disclaimer state
could impose fishing and hunting fees on non-Indians on a reservation. SI The court reasoned that the state's interest in preserving wildlife living or migrating within the boundries of both the
state and the reservation was sufficiently strong to override the
•
25. 207 u.s. 564 (1908). Winters involved reservation of non-navigable waters by
withdrawal from the public domain for use 88 an Indian reservation. Specifically, the
Winters Court found that when a reservation is created out of the public domain there is
an implied reservation of water sufficient to sustain the tribal existence. Id. at 576.
26. See supra note 22.
27. Montana's enabling act provides that the state "disclaim all right and title to
the unappropriated public lands ... owned or held by any Indian or Indian tribes
. . . . " 25 Stat. 676 (1889).
28. The constitutional disclaimer provides: "[A)lliands owned or held by any Indian
or Indian tribes shall remain under the absolute jurisdiction and control of the United
States . . . . " MONT. CONST. art. I. The disclaimers were part of the treaty agreements
negotiated between the United States and Indian tribes. By agreeing to discontinue
fighting, the Indians were promised several parcels of land in newly admitted states.
29. See Worchester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1832).
30. The trend allowing greater jurisdictional authority to the states is called the 88similationist trend. See Dellwo, Recent Developments in the Northwest Regarding Indian Water Rights, 20 NAT. RESOURCES J. 101 (1980) [hereinafter Dellwo).
31. 649 F.2d 1274, 1284 (9th Cir. 1981).
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disclaimer. 32 Consequently, the Ninth Circuit's holding avoided
any determination of reserved rights in a state with a jurisdictional disclaimer.
The McCarran Amendment and Public Law 83-280
Two pieces of federal legislation passed during the 1950's
have worked together to enhance state jurisdictional powers over
Indian affairs. In 1952, Congress enacted the McCarran amendment which granted state courts jurisdiction over the United
States when litigation involved comprehensive adjudication of
water rights and the United States was a necessary party.33 The
amendment resulted in extending the consent of the United
States to be joined in litigation regarding water rights by waiving federal sovereign immunity in certain instances. 34 While the
McCarran amendment did not specifically refer to Indian water
rights or reservation land, it is applicable where the federal government litigates as trustee for Indian tribes.
A year after passage of the McCarran amendment, Public
Law 83-280 311 (PL-280) was enacted, establishing the mechanism
for transfering criminal and civil jurisdiction over Indian lands
from the federal to state governments. Five states received a
mandatory transfer of jurisdiction under PL-280. 38 All other
states had the option to assume jurisdiction if they so elected. A
32. An example of regulatory authority is a state's interest in conserving fish and
game. This arises because a tribe cannot claim to "own" the fish and game on a reservation. Consequently, the state has a "special interest in regulating and preserving wildlife
for the benefit of its citizens." 649 F.2d at 1283, citing Baldwin v. Montana Fish & Game
Comm'n, 436 U.S. 371, 392 (1978).
33. 43 U.S.C. § 666 (1976). The pertinent portion of the McCarran Act states:
(a) Consent is given to join the United States as a defendant
in any suit (1) for adjudication of rights to the use of water of
a river system or other source, or (2) for the administration of
such rights, where it appears that the United States is the
owner of or is in the process of acquiring water rights by appropriation under State law, by purchase, by exchange, or otherwise, and the United States is a necesary party to such suit.
34. See supra note 33.
35. Act of Aug. IS, 1953, ch. 50S, 67 Stat. 588-90 (now codified as amended in 28
U.S.C. § 18 (1976».
36. Originally, the statute automatically transferred to five willing states, and offered to all others, civil and criminal jurisdiction over reservation Indians regardless of
the Indians' preference for continued autonomy. The five states were: California, Minnesota, Nebraska, Oregon, and Wisconsin. Alaska was added in 1958. Act of Aug. 8, 1958,
Pub. L. No. 85-615, § 2, 72 Stat. 545 (1958).
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1968 amendment to PL-280 imposed the requirement that the
states obtain the consent of Indian tribes before exercising jurisdiction over Indian affairs. 37 The amendment also increased the
difficulty for those states, like Montana, to repeal their jurisdictional disclaimers affecting Indian lands.
In Washington v. Yakima Indian Nation,38 the Supreme
Court held that states with disclaimers could validly assume jurisdiction so long as the state utilized the proper legislative repeals. 39 While Yakima made clear that a state constitutional
amendment was not necessary to adopt PL-280 jurisdiction, it
did not establish clear guidelines as to what constitutes a valid
legislative repeal.
Although PL-280 makes no mention of water rights, it has
operated, in conjunction with the McCarran amendment, to
drastically decrease traditional federal protection over Indian
water rights. Matters previously under either federal or tribal
authority40 have been opened to state jurisdiction.

Concurrent Jurisdiction Under the McCarran Amendment
In United States v. District Court for Eagle County,41 the
Supreme Court held that state jurisdiction is permissible in
cases involving general adjudication of all rights of water users.
The Court also held that the McCarran amendment's consent to
jurisdiction includes reserved water rights claims.42 Relying on
Eagle County, the Court in Akin extended permissive state jurisdiction to encompass Indian reserved rights. The Court inter37. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1322-26 (1976). Section 1326 provides:
State jurisdiction acquired pursuant to this subchapter with
respect to criminal offenses or civil causes of action, or with
respect to both, shall be applicable in Indian country only
where the enrolled Indians within the affected area of such Indian country accept such jurisdiction by a majority vote of the
adult Indians ....
38. 439 U.S. 463 (1979).
39. What constitutes appropriate legislative repeals has been the focal point of considerable litigation, including the Adsit case. For an excellent historical overview of PL280, see Goldberg, Public Law 280: The Limits of State Jurisdiction Over Reservation
Indians, 22 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 535 (1975) [hereinafter Goldberg).
40. For a discussion of the federal-tribal-state role in Indian affairs and its current
development, see Dellwo, supra note 30.
41. 401 U.S. 520 (1971).
42. Id. at 524.
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preted the McCarran amendment to mean that jurisdiction over
Indian water rests concurrently in the federal and state courts.
Specifically, the Court held that considerations of "wise judicial
administration"43 justify dismissal of a federal suit. Several exceptional circumstances were listed that justify state adjudication of Indian water rights. 44 Furthermore, the Court held that
in state comprehensive water plan litigation, states could join
the United States as a party defendant. 4G
The Tenth Circuit's Application

Since Akin arose in Colorado, a state that did not disclaim
jurisdiction over Indian rights or land in its constitution or enabling act, the Akin Court was not faced with determining the
effect of jurisdictional disclaimers. The Tenth Circuit, however,
faced this question in Jicarilla Apache Tribe v. United States,48
and held that the presence of a disclaimer in the state's constitution or enabling act does not justify treating the state differently than a state without a disclaimer.
The Tenth Circuit was persuaded by the Akin rationale and
previous Supreme Court decisions. 47 Particularly influential was
Organized Village of Kake v. Egan48 (Kake), which held that a
disclaimer state could regulate the fishing of off-reservation Indians. The Tenth Circuit interpreted the holding in Kake to
43. Akin, 424 U.S. at 818. The principle of "wise judicial administration" relates to
the determination that the Akin factors exist. If these factors do exist, the federal court
must consent to state court adjudication.
44. [d. The exceptional circumstances present in Akin are commonly known as the
"Akin factors." They include the following: (1) The state litigation involved a completed
proceeding, while the federal proceedings were infantile; (2) The state proceeding was
comprehensive, while the federal proceeding was piecemeal; (3) The state proceeding was
initiated prior to the federal proceeding; (4) The federal proceeding was 300 miles from
the district in question, therefore suggestive of a forum non conveniens; (5) The federal
government was participating in state water rights proceedings in other parts of the
state, indicating a potential conflict of interest.
45. The Akin Court rejected the argument advanced by the United States that the
McCarran amendment granted consent to join the United States as a party defendant in
a state court proceeding only if the water rights of the United States were acquired pursuant to state law. The Court held that the state court was dealing with an all-inclusive
statute concerning "the adjudication of rights to the use of water of a river system"
including those waters reserved by the United States for the use of the Indian reservations. 424 U.S. 800, 810, citing Eagle County, 401 U.S. 520, 524.
46. 601 F.2d 1116 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 995 (1979).
47. [d.
48. 369 U.S. 60 (1962).
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mean that disclaimers are limited to matters of a proprietary nature. 49 As a result, it held that the McCarran amendment authorizes a state, which disclaimed jurisdiction upon entering the
Union, to assume jurisdiction over federally reserved Indian
water rights. liD The Jicarilla court's holding is consistent with
the trend, particularly evident since Akin, of increasing state jurisdiction over Indian affairs. iiI
D.

THE NINTH CIRCUIT DECISION

The plaintiffs in Adsit argued that because of the disclaimers in Montana's constitution li3 and enabling act, the federal
courts had exclusive jurisdiction over Indian water rights. They
maintained that Akin was not controlling because it did not involve a state with jurisdictional disclaimers. Furthermore, the
plaintiffs argued that since the disclaimers had not been repealed by Montana, state jurisdiction was barred. liS
The defendants argued that jurisdictional disclaimers only
preclude a state from adjudicating proprietary interests. They
asserted that the Montana litigation involved water rights, and
therefore the disclaimers did not bar the state from assuming
jurisdiction. The defendants maintained that the exceptional
circumstances1i4 in Akin which overcame policies favoring federal
adjudication of Indian water rights were also present in Adsit.
Consequently, in the interest of "wise judicial administration,"1i1i
a comprehensive adjudication of all related water rights issues in
state court was necessary.
1.

The Majority Opinion

The Disclaimer Issue
Beginning its analysis with a discussion of jurisdictional disclaimers, the Ninth Circuit found that Akin was not controlling
because Colorado, the state where Akin arose, did not have ju49. The Tenth Circuit held that a disclaimer state could assert jurisdiction over Indian lands as long as such interference did not "interfere with reservation self-government or impair a right granted or reserved by federal law." 610 F.2d at 1135.
50. [d.
51. See Dellwo, supra note 30.
52. See supra note 28.
53. 668 F.2d at 1083.
54. See supra note 44.
55. 424 U.S. at 818-19.
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risdictional disclaimers. liS Since Montana did have a valid jurisdictional disclaimer, the court focused on the enactment and repeal of the disclaimer.
The distinction between states with and without jurisdictional disclaimers was predicated on an analysis of the legislative
intent underlying the passage of PL-280. The court found that
PL-280 was enacted primarily to control "the problem of lawlessness on certain Indian reservations ... [that lack] adequate
tribal institutions for law enforcement."117 With this in mind, the
Ninth Circuit examined section 6 of PL-280 which states: "The
provisions of this subchapter shall not become effective with respect to such assumption of jurisdiction by any such State until
the people thereof have appropriately amended their State constitution or statutes, as the case may be. "lIB This section imposes
the requirement that a state take affirmative action before assuming jurisdiction over Indian affairs. liB
Despite the apparent unambiguous language of section 6,
Montana argued that amendment was not a prerequisite to the
assumption of jurisdiction under PL-280 because Congress had
delegated its regulatory authority in Indian country to the states
when it passed the McCarran amendment.so The Ninth Circuit,
however, found that the Supreme Court's decision of Washington v. Yakima Indian Nation sl was controlling. In Yakima, the
Court held that for a state to repeal its disclaimer of jurisdiction, the state must follow its usual procedural means of amending its constitution. S2
56. 668 F.2d at 1085.
57. Id. at 1084. See H. R. REp. No. 848, 83d Cong., 1st Seas. 5-6 (1953), quoted in
Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 379-80 (1975).
58. 25 U.S.C. § 1324 (1976) ..
59. S. REP. No. 699, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 5, 6-7 (1953) (including report on PL-280
by Department of Interior).
60. Montana argued that its disclaimers prohibit regulation, alienation, encumbrance, or taxation of Indian property held in trust by the United States, but no more;
therefore, repeal is not necessary before the state can accept jurisdiction under PL-28O.
Alternatively, it noted that the disclaimers only require that Indian reservations "shall
be and remain under the absolute jurisdiction and control of the United States." Since
Congress can repeal PL-28O at will and return jurisdiction to itself, Montana claimed
Indian lands are never outside the absolute control of CongreBB under the Act. See State
ex. rel. McDonald v. District Court, 159 Mont. 156, 496 P.2d 78 (1972).
61. 439 U.S. 463 (1979).
62. Id. at 493.
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In rejecting Montana's argument, the Adsit court held that
the McCarran amendment "cannot be read to amend a state
constitution disclaiming subject matter jurisdiction over such
matters."es Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit held that the district
court erred by failing to determine whether or not such a valid
legislative repeal had been accomplished. 84 Because the Adsit
court determined that the disclaimers had not been repealed, it
did not examine the waiver of sovereign immunity provisions of
the McCarran amendment or the Akin decision.ell
Having determined that the existence of jurisdictional disclaimers was decisive, and distinguishing Akin on this basis, the
Ninth Circuit chose not to follow the Tenth Circuit's reasoning
in Jicarilla. Since Jicarilla did not recognize the distinction between states with disclaimers and those without, the Ninth Circuit disagreed with the Jicarilla court's application of Kake. ee
The Ninth Circuit viewed the Kake and White Mountain
cases as extensions of the state's judicial power to an area already effectively under state jurisdiction.eT Even though both
Kake and White Mountain dealt with states having jurisdic-·
tional disclaimers,ee the Ninth Circuit opined that the regulatory
rights involved in these cases fell "far short of the power to adjudicate a direct challenge to Indian water rights in and to the
waters of streams."et Therefore, the effect of both cases on Indian rights was minimal and thus insufficient precedent to extend state jurisdiction over substantive property rights.
~he

Akin

~actor8

The Ninth Circuit found that even if the jurisdictional dis63. 66S F.2d at 1085.
64. [d. at 1086.
65. [d. at 1085-86.
66. See supra text accompanying notes 46-51.
67. 66S F.2d at 1087.
68. White Mountain originated in Arizona, a state that disclaimed jurisdiction.
Kake, originated in Alaska, a state that repealed its disclaimers in 1958. The state was,
however, attempting to claim that it could regulate pursuant to the exception in PL-280
protecting hunting and fishing rights. The Court treated Alaska as if it still had a disclaimer by holding that Alaska did not need the exception In PL-280 to 888ert jurisdiction over the fishing area in question because CongreBB had never reserved the territory
for the Indians. The scope of the disclaimer was thus irrelevant. For an excellent discussion of PL-280, see Goldberg, supra note 39.
69. 66S F.2d at 1087.
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claimers had been repealed it would nonetheless be compelled to
reverse the lower court.70 In dictum, the court discussed the exceptional circumstance factors set forth in Akin.
The Ninth Circuit analyzed the exceptional circumstances
and disposed of each under the facts of Adsit: (1) Colorado had
an extensive ongoing water plan, whereas Montana's began four
years after the federal suits were filed; (2) in Akin, the state proceeding was comprehensive while the federal proceeding was
piecemeal; in Adsit, however, the federal proceeding was no
more piecemeal than was the state's;71 (3) in Akin, the state proceeding was initiated prior to the federal suit; in Adsit the federal proceeding was the predecessor;711 and (4) in Akin the federal proceeding was 300 miles from the water district in
question, whereas in Adsit, the factor of an inconvenient forum
was not present. 73
Finally, the Ninth Circuit expressed concern over the risk of
creating a conflict of interest by requiring the United States to
represent all of its diverse interests. 74 Specifically, the court's
concern was that when Indian tribes are a necessary party to a
state proceeding, and neither the federal government nor the tribal nation has consented to such a suit in state court, imposing
state jurisdiction would violate the tribe's sovereign immunity.711
The tribe could only protect its rights by intervening, at the expense of waiving its soveriegn immunity. The Ninth Circuit considered it inappropriate to place the tribe in such a "Hobson's
choice. "78
70.Id.
71. 668 F.2d at 1088-89. The Adsit court stated that the district court never made
any findings on the issue of comprehensiveness. It then pointed out that Akin stressed
federal dismissal only when the federal proceeding is piecemeal and the state proceeding
is comprehensive. Without this determination, the Adsit court determined that the federal court may not abdicate its judicial obligations. Id. at 1089.
72. The Adsit court stated that this factor was not determinative, however, as both
proceedings were in their infancy. Id.
73.Id.
74. The diverse interests the United States may potentially have to protect include
the national parks, national monuments, and reclamation projects. See Abrams, Reserved Water Rights, Indian Rights and the Narrowing Scope of Federal Jurisdiction:
The Colorado River Decision, 30 STAN. L. REv. 1111 (1978).
75. 668 F.2d at 1090.
76.Id.
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The Dissenting Opinion

The dissent adopted the Tenth Circuit's analysis in Jicarilla, finding that there was no proprietary claim made over
Indian lands or water rights. 77 For the dissent, the sole question
was whether the language "absolute jurisdiction and control of
the United States"78 as stated in Montana's constitution should
be construed to mean "exclusive jurisdiction" of the federal
courts over all suits involving Indian lands or property rights. 7s
The dissent relied on Kake for the proposition that "absolute" jurisdiction and control does not mean "exclusive" jurisdiction, thereby indicating that in certain instances there may
be concurrent jurisdiction.80 In addition, because personal jurisdiction was unobtainable over all the defendants,81 the principles of "wise judicial administration," allowing the state to adjudicate the action, should be invoked. 81 This was particularly true
in light of the fact that the rights of the Indians would first be
determined in federal court, and the entire issue then relitigated
in state court.
The dissent concluded by discussing the policy factors
weighing in favor of state adjudication, emphasizing that water
adjudication is primarily a local concern. Because of the scarcity
of water in the western states,88 it is important that each state
distribute its water in an appropriate manner. Therefore, as long
as Montana "gives recognition to Indian water rights and their
establishment pursuant to federal law, [there is] ... no good
reason why Indians should not be joined with all other water
users in the state in order to achieve a comprehensive state
adjudication. "84
E.

SIGNIFICANCE

In Adsit, the Ninth Circuit expressly disagreed with the
Tenth Circuit's decision in Jicarilla and held that a state's juris77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

[d. at 1091.
[d., quoting MONT. CONST. art. I.
[d. at 1091.
369 U.S. 60, 71-72 (1962). See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
There were nearly 9,000 defendants in the Adsit caae. See supra note 16.
668 F.2d at 1092.
See R. CLARK, supra note 22.
668 F.2d at 1092.
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dictional disclaimers prohibits it from assuming jurisdiction over
reserved Indian water rights. The Ninth Circuit determined that
the McCarran amendment, which overrides federal immunity in
comprehensive water adjudications, "cannot be read to amend a
state constitution disclaiming subject matter jurisdiction"86 over
Indian affairs.
Having determined that the district court's ruling on the
disclaimer issue was incorrect, the court could have remanded
the case for a determination of whether Montana had validly repealed their disclaimer of jurisdiction.88 Instead, it determined
that the disclaimer had not been repealed. No further analysis
was needed to reach a decision. However, the court used the Adsit case as a vehicle to discuss Akin's special circumstance
factors.
The Ninth Circuit's narrow interpretation of the Akin factors reflects its disapproval of diminishing federal jurisdiction
over Indian water rights litigation. The court's underlying fear
of accepting Akin as controlling authority lies in Akin's potential for prohibiting Indians from ever fully litigating their rights
in federal court. Each time a tribe sued in federal court, the
state could join the United States as a party to obtain
dismissal. 87
The Ninth Circuit's concern over such a liberal interpretation of the McCarran amendment's grant of jurisdiction is well
founded. As the Adsit case demonstrates, a state may attempt to
prevent Indians from litigating in federal court by stalling long
enough and enacting a comprehensive statute. 88 Clearly, Akin
was predicated on allowing the state to adjudicate a water rights
proceeding when the state had ,a comprehensive water plan.
85. [d. at 1085.

86. In Adsit's companion case, San Carlos Apache Tribe v. State of Arizona, 668
F.2d 1093 (9th Cir.), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 50 (1982), the Ninth Circuit remanded the
dispute to the district court to determine whether or not Arizona had properly asserted
jurisdiction pursuant to PL-280. [d. at 1098.
87. 668 F.2d at 1090.
88. Montana's water consolidation plan did not take effect until 1979, four years
after the Indians first brought suit in federal court. This delay in the enactment of the
water plan suggests that Montana may have been forum shopping. When litigation arose
that appeared to be unfavorable to the state's own interests, Montana formulated a
water plan in an attempt to fall within the purview of Akin and thereby circumvent
federal jurisdiction.
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Akin was not intended to defeat federal jurisdiction when it appeared that the state's strong self-serving interests would be
treated more favorably in state court. S9
The Ninth Circuit's holdil!g in Adsit is based on a reasoned
application of legislative history, which supports its interpretation of state jurisdictional disclaimers and PL-280. 90 The court
also carefully distinguished the Kake and White Mountain
cases. Jicarilla's reliance on the differences in proprietary and
governmental functions seems to go "too far."91 However, further judicial guidance is needed on how to categorize what is a
legitimate governmental regulation. In many instances, Indian
tribes continue to need the protection of sovereign immunity
and federal jurisdiction. Without these shields, adjudication of
their rights would too often be at the discretion of frequently
biased state courts. 91
Despite the majority's sound opinion, the dissent raises several valid points. The dissent's support of state jurisdiction focused on the complications of piecemeal adjudication inherent in
instances of concurrent jurisdiction. This concern was considered to be the dispositive factor in the Akin decision. The dissent stressed the policy of water allocation as being a local concern deserving local adjudication.
However valid the desires to avoid piecemeal adjudication
and to protect state's rights to allocate water may be, it can be
strongly argued that federal reserved water rights should take
precedent over legitimate state interests. The determination of
Indian and other reserved rights should turn not on issues of
diversion, but rather on Congress' original intent to reserve a
certain amount of water to support federal and Indian lands. 98
89. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
90. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
91. 668.F.2d at 1087.
92. Under Jicarilla, states would be allowed to create comprehensive regulatory
statutes for Indian affairs over which they wish to obtain jurisdiction. This suggests that
the only restraint on the states would be the commerce clause of the United States
Constitution.
The Indians' fear of unfair treatment stems from the economic advantage the states
would gain if water rights were allocated more favorably to its citizens. See supra note 22
and accompanying text.
93. Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908). For a discussion of the Winters
case, see supra note 25.
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Consequently, if the litigation takes place in state court, there is
still the need to have separate proceedings prior to the overall
adjudication of water rights. 84 These proceedings would determine the amounts of reserved water to be allocated to the Indians. Virtually this same process of separate adjudication would
be necessary in both the state and federal forum. In essence,
federal court adjudication would be no more piecemeal than
would state court adjudication.
F.

CONCLUSION

The Adsit court's holding is an expression of the Ninth Circuit's dissatisfaction with diminishing federal jurisdiction over
Indian affairs. The court also used the case to urge clarification
of the issue by the Supreme Court.8a At a minimum, Adsit assures Indians in Montana that their reserved water rights will be
litigated in federal court. Optimally, however, the Ninth Circuit's plea for clarification will be answered either by the Supreme Court or Congress. If the Supreme Court or Congress
does not heed this plea, the Ninth Circuit has left no doubt that
it is limiting the expansion of state power over Indian rights.

Mark R. Peterson·

REHNER v. RICE: STATE JURISDICTION OVER LIQUOR
TRANSACTIONS IN INDIAN COUNTRY
A.

INTRODUCTION

In Rehner v. Rice, l a consolidation of three cases involving
Indian tribes in California and Washington, the Ninth Circuit
held that Indian tribes have exclusive licensing and distribution
jurisdiction over liquor transactions on Indian lands. s In the Cal94. Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 82425 (Stewart, J., diBBenting).
95. The Supreme Court recently consolidated Adsit, San Carlos, and Navajo Nation and granted certiorari, 103 S. Ct. 50 (1982).
• Second year student, Golden Gate University School of Law.
1. 678 F.2d 1340 (9th Cir.) (en bane), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 291 (1982).

2. 678 F.2d at 1342.
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ifornia case, 8 a federally licensed Indian trader was denied an
exemption from a California law requiring a license for the sale
of liquor. 4 In the two cases from Washington,'! the state, seeking
to enforce its liquor monopoly laws, seized liquor enroute to the
Muckleshoot and Tulalip reservations. 6 The Ninth Circuit held
that 18 U.S.C. section 1161 preempts state licensing and distribution jurisdiction over liquor transactions. 7 Washington, however, would not be precluded from seizing liquor if the district
court on remand found the state sales tax valid. s
This note will examine the Ninth Circuit's use of traditional
federal Indian preemption principles to limit state assertion of
regulatory jurisdiction despite section 1161's requirement that
liquor transactions be "in conformity with state law."9 The question remains, however, whether federal preemption is sufficient
to invalidate the state tax on liquor sales to non-tribal members
in light of a recent Supreme Court decision validating a state
sales tax on cigarettes sold on a reservation. 10
B.

FACTS

The California Case: Rehner v. Rice

Eva Rehner, a federally licensed Indian trader, owned and
operated a small general store on the Pala Reservation. 11 She
3. Rehner v. Rice, No. 77-24094 (S.O. Cal. 1977).
4. 678 F.2d at 1342.
5. Muckleshoot Indian Tribe v. State of Washington, No. C78-783V (W.O. Wash.
1979), reprinted in 6 INDIAN L. REP. (AM. INDIAN LAW. TRAINING PROGRAM) F-36 (1979)
and Tulalip Indian Tribes v. State of Washington, No. 79-4404 (W.O. Wash. 1979).
6. 678 F.2d at 1342.
7. 1d. at 1349.
8.1d.
9. 18 U.S.C. § 1161 (1976) provides:
The provisions of sections 1154, 1156, 3133, 3488, and 3618, of
this title, shall not apply within any area that is not Indian
country, nor to any act or transaction within any area of Indian country provided such act or transaction is in conformity
both with the laws of the State in which such act or transaction occurs and with an ordinance duly adopted by the tribe
having jurisdiction over such area of Indian country, certified
by the Secretary of the Interior, and published in the Federal
Register.
10. Washington v. Confederate Tribes of the Colville Reservation, 447 U.S. 134
(1980).
11. 678 F.2d at 1342. Federal law requires that any person desiring to sell goods to
Indians inside a reservation must secure federal approval. 25 U.S.C. § 262 (1976). Such
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sought an exemption from a California law requiring a liquor license for the sale of intoxicants for off-premises consumption. I I
When the California Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control
denied her request, she brought an action in federal district
court for injunctive and declaratory relief. 18 The district court
dismissed her case on the ground that she failed to state a claim
and concluded she needed a state license. I f

The Washington Cases: Muckleshoot Indian Tribe v. State of
Washington and Tulalip Indian Tribes v. State of Washington
The Muckleshoot and Tulalip tribes passed ordinances pursuant to their authority under 18 U.S.C. section·U61 purporting
to comprehensively and exclusively regulate the introduction,
purchase, sale, licensing and taxation of liquor transactions
within their respective boundaries. 1I While both ordinances allowed a grace period during which persons currently holding
valid state licenses would be permitted to operate subject to application and approval of a license from the tribal government,16
persons are subject to extensive federal regulation. 25 C.F.R. § 140 (1982).
12. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE 23394 (West Supp. 1982) provides: "An off-sale general
license includes the privileges specified in Section 23393 and authorizes the sale, to consumers only and not for resale . . . of distilled spirits· for consumption off the premises
where sold."
13. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 23090 (West Supp. 1982) provides that all appeals
from decisions of the Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Board be taken to the California Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals on a writ of review.
14. 678 F.2d at 1342.
15. The Muckleshoot Liquor Ordinance, 43 Fed. Reg. 26,616 (1978) states the purpose of providing for the exclusive purchase and sale of liquor through tribal enterprise
as increasing the ability of the tribal government to control reservation liquor distribution and possession and to provide for an "important" source of revenue for the continued operation of the tribal government and delivery of tribal services. Id. at § l(d). The
ordinance specifically provides that any liquor transaction not in conformity with the
ordinance would be subject to the federal Indian liquor laws. Id. at § 5. A Liquor Division was created which has general regulatory power to purchase liquor, fix prices and
collect and levy taxes. ld. at § 7. The Muckleshoot Liquor Commission was created to
control and manage all liquor sales and Bales outlets. ld. at § 9. Finally, the ordinance
provides that all tax revenues will be used for the reservation and tribal community with
priority given to tribal courts and delivery of basic social services. ld. at § 10.
The Tulalip Liquor Ordinance No. 43, 42 Fed. Reg. 46,612 (1977) also provides for
the exclusive tribal control of the introduction, purchase, sale and taxation of liquor
transactions. The Tulalip Liquor Commission was granted pOwer to enter into contracts,
purchase"liquor, manage sales, and collect and issue licenses, taxes, and fees. ld. at § 6.
The Tulalip Liquor Store was created as the tribal outlet for sales. Id. at § 8. All revenue
is to be remitted to the general fund of the Tulalip Tribes. Id. at § 7.
16. Muckleshoot Liquor Ordinance, supra note 15, at § 5; Tulalip Liquor Ordinance,
supra note 15, at § 6. Both ordinances provide that Washington state substantive "stan-
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neither the tribes nor their subordinates applied for a liquor license from the Washington State Liquor Control Board.
The State of Washington holds a monopoly over all liquor
sales within state boundaries so that liquor must be sold through
state authorized stores. 1' The revenue earned is distributed to
local governments, but not to Indian tribal governments. 1S In
1978, the Liquor Control Board seized shipments of liquor enroute to the Muckleshoot and Tulalip reservations claiming that
its liquor monopoly laws and the state sales taxes extended to
reservation liquor transactions. 18
The tribes brought actions in federal district court for injunctive relief, and Washington counterclaimed for injunctive
and monetary relief. lIo The district court held that the tribes exercise exclusive regulatory jurisdicton over liquor transactions on
Indian reservations, and enjoined the state from seizing liquor
enroute to the reservations. The court then granted summary
judgment in favor of the tribes on Washington's counterclaim. III
dards" are applicable:
Nothing herein contained shall be construed to supercede the
substantive laws of the State of Washington effective within
the exterior boundaries of the Tulalip Indian Reservaton and,
where not inconsistent herewith, the substantive standards of
the criminal laws of the State of Washington regarding sale,
consumption and use of liquor shall apply.
Tulalip Ordinance No. 43, 42 Fed. Reg. 46,612 (1977).
17. WASH. REv. CODE § 66.32.010 (1974) provides: "Except as permitted by the
board, no liquor shall be kept or had by any person within this state unle88 the package
in which the liquor was contained had, while containing that liquor, been sealed with the
official seal adopted by the board . . . ."
18. 678 F.2d at 1343.
19. The Muckleshoot and Tulalip tribes contracted with the Central Liquor Company, a federally licensed distributor located in Oklahoma City for the purchase of liquor. The liquor seized was enroute from Oklahoma City. rd. at 1342.
20. 678 F.2d at 1343.
21. Muckleshoot Indian Tribe v.. Washington, No. C78·783V (W.D. Wash., 1979).
Subsequent to this decision, the Washington Court of Appeals in Washington ex rei.
Maleng v. Ankeen District Court, No. 10351·2·1 (Wash. Ct. App., May 5, 1982), reo
printed in 9 INDIAN L. REP. (AM. INDIAN LAW TRAINING PROGRAM) 5062 (1982) upheld the
conviction of persons who purchased and transported liquor outside the reservation in
violation of WASH. REv. CODE § 66.44.160 (1974) which makes it illegal to p08se88 liquor
not sold through a government authorized store. The court noted that the Muckleshoot
decision had only enjoined the state from seizing liquor enroute to the reservation, but it
also pointed out that its decision was narrow in that defendants had not raised the issue
of whether WASH. REv. CODE § 66.44.160 (1974) was in conflict with congressional plenary authority to regulate commerce among the Indian tribes pursuant to Art. I, § 8 of
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BACKGROUND

Application of State Liquor Laws under 18 U.S.C. section 1161
The Rehner court was required to examine section 1161's
provision that Indian liquor transactions be "in conformity both
with the laws of the state in which such act or transaction occurs
and with an ordinance duly adopted by the tribe having jurisdiction,"1111 to determine if Congress intended that state licensing
and monopoly laws applied.
In 1953, Congress passed section 1161 to permit the introducton of liquor in Indian country.lIS Congress, early in its
history, had enacted prohibitions against the introduction, sale,
and possession of liquor in Indian country.24 These prohibitions
remained in effect twenty years after the twenty-first amendment2& ended the prohibition era and repealed federal criminal
penalties for the transportation and use of liquor within the
states. Congress, with the enactment of section 1161, conditionally lifted these prohibitions.
The sparse legislative history of this law suggests that the
primary intent of the legislation was to end what the Indians
claimed was unfair discrimination. lie Section 1161 allows a state
or local municipality or Indian tribe, if either so desires, and by
enactment of proper legislation or ordinance, to restrict the sales
the United States Constitution. See infra note 33.
22. 18 U.S.C. § 1161 (1976). See supra note 9 for text.
23. Act of Aug. 15, 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-277, ch. 502 § 267, 67 Stat. 586 (1953)
(current version at 18 U.S.C. § 1161 (1976».
;'4. These prohibitions are now codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1154, 1156. 3113, and 3488
(1976). Since 1834 federal law had penalized both the introduction of liquor into Indian
country and the operation of distilleries therein. Possession of liquor was made a separate offense in 1918. For a detailed history of congressional action over liquor transactions, see F. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 306-07 (1982).
25. U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, § 2 provides: "The transportation or importation into
any State, Territory or possession of the United States for delivery or use therein of
intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws thereof. is hereby prohibited."
26. S. REP. No. 722, 83d Cong., 1st Sass., reprinted in 1953 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD.
NEWS 2399, 2400. In the "Explanation to the Bill" contained in the report, it was noted
that Indians had complained that it was unfair to legislate specifically against them.
regardless of the merits of prohibition. Section 1161 was enacted at the same time as
other legislation aimed specifically at ending certain discriminatory laws against Indians.
See Letter from Orme Lewis, Asst. Secretary of the Interior, to the Chairman of the
House Committee on Interior Insular Affairs (July 7, 1953), reprinted in 1953 U.S. CODE
CONGo & AD. NEWS 2400.
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of intoxicants to Indians.27 Neither the Act nor its legislative
history, however, gives insight into Congress' intent concerning
enforcement jurisdiction and the applicability of state licensing
and monopoly schemes.
Although the Interior Solicitor had indicated, in 1954, that
an Indian desiring to operate a bar on a reservation would have
to obtain a state license,ss the Solicitor held officially in 1971 S9
that the state of Montana did not have enforcement or licensing
jurisdiction over Indians operating liquor establishments on a
reservation. 80 Two federal courts have held that reservation Indians need not obtain a state liquor license to sell liquor within
the reservation. 81
27. S. REP. No. 722, supra note 26, at 2400.
28. Letter from the Interior Solicitor to John W. Stilley of the Arizona State Legislature (March 26, 1954), cited in 2 OP. SOLICITOR 2026, 2029 (1974).
29. Memorandum from Interior Solicitor to Comm'r of Indian Affairs (Feb. 3, 1971),
reprinted in 2 OP. SOLICITOR 2026 (1974).
30. The Chippewa Tribe passed an ordinance in conformity with section 1161 authorizing liquor on the reservation. The tribe then applied for a liquor license from the
Montana Liquor Control Board but there were no licenses available under the Montana
quota system. The Solicitor held that had Congress intended to impose state enforcement jurisdiction, it could have done so expressly. The Solicitor concluded that Congress
intended that state law should be used as a "standard of measurement" to define lawful
and unlawful activity on the reservation. Any act not in conformity with state law would
invoke federal penalties which had been conditionally lifted by section 1161. 1d. at 2027.
The Solicitor noted that Justice Black, in dicta, in Warren Trading Post v. Arizona State
Tax Commission, 380 U.S. 685, 687 n.3 (1965), referred to section 1161 as permitting
application of state liquor law "standards." 2 OP. SOLICITOR at 2027 n.l. The Solicitor
also held that the tribe had, as an attribute of its inherent sovereign power, the right to
license a subordinate entity or tribal member to operate a liquor establishment on the
reservation. The imposition of a state liquor license requirement on these entities would
be an unlawful infringement of the reservation Indians' right to tribal self-government.
1d. at 2028.
31. Zaste v. North Dakota, No. Al-75-29 (D.N.D., June 21, 1977), reprinted in 4
INDIAN L. REP. (AM. INDIAN LAW. TRAINING PROGRAM) F-128 (1977). Plaintiff was an enrolled member of the Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa Indians and possessed a license from the Turtle Mountain Tribal Council for on and off premises sale of liquor.
The Turtle Mountain Tribal Council had enacted a comprehensive liquor control ordinance. The court in its conclusions of law found that Congress had exclusive authority to
regulate liquor transactions within Indian country. That power was delegated to and exercised by the tribes through section 1161. The section did not constitute consent to. the
states requiring Indian retailers to obtain licenses to sell liquor within Indian country. As
a result, the North Dakota code was in conflict with federal law and was inapplicable to
Indian liquor retailers. 1d. at F-128-29. The court held that the holder of a valid tribal
license does not need a state liquor license.
On facts substantially similar to Rehner, the Tenth Circuit, in United States v. New
Mexico, 590 F.2d 323 (1Oth Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 634 (1979), held that the
state of New Mexico could not require a tribe to obtain a state liquor license in order to
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In United States v. Mazurie,32 the Supreme Court, examining section 1161 in the context of tribal licensing authority, held
that Congress, through section 1161, had delegated a portion of
its plenary power over Indian liquor transactions to the tribes. 33
The tribes, therefore, were empowered to require non-Indians
operating a liquor establishment on the reservation to obtain a
tribal license. 34 The Court never reached the issue of a state licensing requirement because the bar owners were non-Indians
admittedly subject to state law and the tribes had by ordinance
required that a state license also be obtained.311
There has been no federal court ruling with respect to state
liquor monopoly laws. The Associate Solicitor, however, issued
an opinion in 1976 which found that Idaho's liquor monopoly
laws were not applicable under section 1161. 36 The Associate Solicitor stated that state substantive standards were applicable.
Only the tribe had the sovereign authority to determine which
class of persons were permitted to make sales and to whom state
operate a bar on the reservation. The court held that the tribe had sole jurisdiction over
tribal-owned liquor outlets. It concluded that section 1161 did not constitute consent for
New Mexico to extend its regulatory jurisdiction over liquor transactions on the reservation. Id. at 329. The court also noted that the trial court found that due to state quota
restrictions, the cost of a license would be $50,000 and would place a financial burden on
the Tribe. Id. at 325.
32. 419 U.S. 544 (1975).
33. The Court noted that Article I, § 8 of the Constitution gives Congress power
"(tlo regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with
the Indian Tribes." 419 U.S. at 554. It also noted that the Court had repeatedly held
that this clause affords Congress the power to prohibit or regulate the sale of alcoholic
beverages to Indians, and to prohibit or regulate the introducton of alcoholic beverages
into Indian country. Id.
34. Id. at 557. It was argued that Congress could not delegate its power to regulate
liquor transactions to the tribes. The Supreme Court held that the tribes' independent
authority and special status with the United States was sufficient to protect Congress'
decision to vest in tribal councils a portion of its plenary authority to "regulate commerce ... with Indian Tribes."
35. The bar owners argued that they were non-Indians operating a bar on privately
owned land within the reservation and therefore came within an exception provided in
federal liquor laws for "fee-patented lands in non-Indian communities." 18 U.S.C. §
1154(c) (1976). The bar owners argued that they were in such a community, or, in the
alternative, that the exception was unconstitutionally vague. The Court rejected these
arguments, finding that the language was sufficient to advise them that they were subject
to Indian licensing requirements. The Court noted that Congress had always had the
authority to define "Indian country" broadly and to supersede state jurisdiction within
the defined area. 419 U.S. at 555.
36. Letter from the Assoc. Solicitor for Indian Affairs, Dep't of the Interior, to Chief
Counsel, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms, Dep't of the Treasury (January 22,
1976), reprinted in 4 INDIAN L. REP. (AM. INDIAN LAW. TRAINING PROGRAM) i-I (1976).
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standards were to apply. The opinion pointed out that both licensing and monopoly laws have the effect of determining who
will be allowed to engage in wholesale or retail sales on the reservation. This right, however, was vested in the tribes under section 1161.37
Preemption of State Laws by Federal Laws and Treaties Governing Indian Affairs

Outside of express grants of jurisdiction to the states, or in
cases where statutes are ambiguous, the Supreme Court has had
to decide each assertion of state power on a case-by-case basis.
In its decisions, the Court has used either an infringement analysis or a preemption analysis to determine the applicability of
state laws to Indians.
The infringement test, first enunciated in Williams v. Lee,s8
states that "absent governing Acts of Congress, the question has
always been whether the state action infringed on the right of
reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by
them."s9
The term "preemption" was first employed by the Supreme
Court in McClanahan v. Arizona Tax Commission. 40 Its basic
premise is that the federal purposes of Indian treaties and statutes are broadly preemptive of state law even in the absence of
explicit language oU~':ing state jurisdiction. u Thus, it has been
stated that "the purpose of protecting tribal self-government
preempts state laws which would otherwise govern the relations
of Indians with one another, prescribe standards of criminal conduct and punishment, and impose regulations and taxes."42
The McClanahan Court articulated the doctrine as requiring a careful examination of all relevant statutes and treaties
coupled with a recognition of traditional tribal sovereignty and a
37. [d. at i-2.
38. 358 U.S. 217 (1958).
39. [d. at 220.
40. 411 U.S. 164, 172 (1973).
41. For a detailed discussion comparing general federal preemption with preemption
in Indian law, see F. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 270-79 (1982).
42. [d. at 275.
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congressional policy of freeing Indians from state control. 43 If no
preemption of state law is found from the language or the purposes of the statutes and treaties, the court must then balance
the tribe's interests in self-government against legitimate state
interests. 44 State laws may be enforced against non-Indians "up
to the point where tribal self-government would be affected."46
The McClanahan Court developed several rules of construction to determine the scope of preemption. Preemption should
give effect to the plenary and exclusive power of the federal government to regulate Indian affairs even against interference by
the state. 4 & State law will not apply to tribal Indians unless Congress has expressly provided that state law shall apply.47 Ambiguities in the law will usually be resolved in favor of the tribes. 4 &
Determinations in favor of the Indians can be supported by a
long standing policy of leaving Indians free from state control.'"
The fact that Congress has acted consistently on the assumption
that states have no power to regulate the affairs of Indians on
the reservation should be recognized. &0
The McClanahan Court noted that the trend is toward a
reliance on federal preemption to invalidate state law rather
than toward Indian sovereignty.&1 Although the Court as recently as 1980 has stated that both federal preemption and infringement of tribal self-government are independent barriers to
the assertion of state law,&2 it has only invalidated state law
43. 411 U.S. 164, 174.
44. [d. at 171.
45. [d. at 179. It was argued that the state law at issue should be upheld because it

did not actually infringe upon tribal self-government. The Court rejected this argument,
stating that the Williams infringement test should be applied to the activities of nonIndians on the reservation. [d. at 140.
46. The Court later explained the McClanahan principles in Bryan v. Itasca
County, 426 U.S. 373, 376 n.2 (1976).
47. [d., citing McClanahan, 411 U.S. at 168.
48. 411 U.S. at 174.
49. [d. at 169.
50. Bryan, 426 U.S. at 376 n.2.
51. 411 U.S. at 172.
52. White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 44S U.S. 136, 143 (1980). The Court
held that federal preemption and infringement of tribal self-government are independent
barriers, either of which, "standing alone, can be a sufficient basis for holding state law
inapplicable to activity undertaken on the reservation or by tribal members." [d. The
Court noted, however, that the two tests are related in that "the right of tribal selfgovernment is ultimately dependent on and subject to the broad power of Congress." [d.
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where it found overriding federal activity in a given subject
matter. lIS
State Taxation Cases

The Supreme Court clearly has relied on federal preemption
principles to invalidate state tax schemes imposed on reservation activities. Where the subject matter is comprehensively regulated by federal law , the Court will generally invalidate the tax.
The clearest example of such federal preemption was in Warren
Trading Post v. Arizona Tax Commission, G4 where the Supreme
court held that Arizona could not tax the gross receipts of a nonIndian trading post on the Navajo reservation. GG The Court
pointed out that Indian traders were federally licensed and subject to extensive federal regulation. G6 The Court therefore concluded that "Congress has taken the business of Indian trading
on reservations so fully in hand that no room remains for state
laws imposing additional burdens upon traders."G7
In McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Commission,GS the
Court held that the state of Arizona could not impose an income
tax on an Indian whose income was derived solely from the reservation, in the absence of express congressional authorization. G9
The Court stated, however, that when the state has a legitimate
interest in regulating the affairs of non-Indians, that interest
must be accomodated, at least to the point where Indian tribal
self-government would be affected. 60
53. Compare White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 151 (1980)
(invalidating a state motor carrier license and fuel use tax as preempted by extensive
federal regulations over timber operations on Indian reservations) and Central Mach. Co.
v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 448 U.S. 160, 165 (1980) (invalidating state sales tax on
the sale of farm equipment to an Indian Tribe as preempted by federal Indian trader
statutes) with Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463 (1976) and
Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation, 447 U.S. 134 (1980).
54. 380 U.S. 685 (1965).
55. Id. at 690.
56.Id.
57.Id.
58. 411 U.S. 164 (1973).
59. Id. at 171.
60. Id. at 179. The McClanahan Court distinguished situations involving Indians
and non-Indians. Where state law affected Indians, careful scrutiny of the applicable
statutes and treaties was required to determine if federal law preempted state law. It was
argued in the court below that Arizona could impose its taxes because the tribe's right to
self-government was unimpaired. The Court limited the Williams infringement test to
situations involving non-Indians. In those cases, the states had a legitimate authority
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Thus, in Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes,s1
the Court validated a sales tax on the sale of cigarettes to nonIndians when the legal incidence of the tax fell on the non-Indian purchaser. s2 In Moe, the state of Montana attempted to impose personal property taxes on Indians and a cigarette vendor's
license fee on tribal members selling cigarettes on the reservation. It also sought to require the tribe members to precollect a
cigarette sales tax on all sales. The Court invalidated all taxes
imposed directly on Indians, but validated the tax on sales to
non-Indians. ss
In Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation (Colville),s. the Court refused to distinguish Moe from
a situation where the tribe was also imposing its own sales tax.
The Court upheld the tribes' power to tax as a fundamental attribute of self-government. slI Both the tribes and state, however,
were free to impose their own tax schemes." In dicta, the Court
admitted that the tribes might preempt the state power to tax
through a properly delegated federal power to do so, but such a
delegation was not to be inferred by the mere approval by the
federal government of the Indian tax ordinances. S7
over their citizens. The tribes had authority over their own citizens and also had an
interest in Il8serting authority over non-Indians present within their territory. The Court
concluded that the Williams test WIl8 designed to resolve the conflict in favor of the
Indians by holding that the state could "protect its interest up to the point where tribal
government would be affected." Id.
61. 425 U.S. 463 (1976).
62. [d. at 467-68.
63. Id. at 482: The Court's rationale WIl8 that the tax WIl8 paid by the consumer, who
did not enjoy a tax immunity. The tribal smokeshop WIl8 merely precollecting the tax.
The Court held this WIl8 a minimal burden justified by the state's interest in collecting
its valid tax. I d.
64. 447 U.S. 134 (1980).
65. Id. at 152.
66. Id. at 158. The tribes argued that their involvement in the operation and taxation of cigarette sales should oust the state. The Court rejected this argument, stating
that tribes, like all other state residents, are not exempt from state taxes on market
gOods. Id. at 155. The tribes also argued that a double taxation would result in a loss of
revenue to the tribes. The Court held that WIl8hington did not infringe on tribal selfgovernment because the tax would deprive the tribes of revenue. Id. at 156.
Justice Brennan, in his dissenting opinion, argued that there WIl8 an infringement on
tribal self-government. The dissent argued that there WIl8 an actual conflict of jurisdiction and sovereignty because the tax would inject state law into a transaction which the
Indians had chosen to subject to their own laws. The tribes were forced to make a choice
between exercising their right to tax (and losing revenues) and refraining from their right
to tax in order to stay competitive. Id. at 173.
67. Id. at 156.
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In two companion cases decided the same year, the dissenting judges in Colville were able to gather a majority to invalidate
state taxes imposed on non-Indians doing business on the reservation. In White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker,6S the
Court invalidated a state motor carrier tax imposed on a nonIndian contractor who cut timber on a reservation and transported it to an Indian sawmill. The Court found that the extensive federal regulations applying to timber operations in Indian
country preempted the state tax. 6e Similarly, in Central Machinery Co. v. Arizona State Tax Commission,"o the Court invalidated a state gross receipts tax imposed on a non-Indian
business,'1l holding that extensive federal regulation over Indian
trading preempted taxation on the sale of machinery to the
tribe. '12
D.

THE NINTH CIRCUIT DECISION

State Licensing and Distribution Jurisdiction over Indian
Country Liquor Transactions
Washington and California argued that Congress had expressly delegated regulatory as well as substantive authority to
the states through section 1161.'18 The Ninth Circuit began its
analysis by setting out a basic preemption framework. The court
noted that the federal government has a long history of legislation and control over Indian reservation liquor transactions."4 In
light of this history of pervasive control, the court found that
there could be no ground for concluding that Congress had removed its "veil of preemption" unless section 1161 expressly au68. 448 U.S. 136 (1980).
69. [d. at 151. The Court noted that revenue from the timber operations is used to
undertake a wide variety of measures to ensure the productivity of the forest, including
reforestation, fire control, wildlife promotion, road improvement, safety inspections, and
general policing of the forest. On the other hand, the state failed to show any legitimate
regulatory interest or governmental function to be performed for those on whom the
taxes fall. [d. at 150. Furthermore, the Court noted that there is a current federal policy
of promoting tribal self-sufficiency and economic development. [d. at 143. The dissent
argued that the taxes imposed did not substantially reduce tribal revenues and the majority had only assumed an interference with federal purpose. [d. at 159.
70. 448 U.S. 160 (1980).
71. [d. at 165.
72. [d. at 150-51.
73. See supra note 9 for text of 18 U.S.C. § 1161 (1976)
74. 678 F.2d at 1343.
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thorized state jurisdiction.'III The court then outlined its basic
rules of construction according to the McClanahan guidelines.'I6
Washington and California pointed to the grammatical
structure of section 1161, arguing that section 1161 requires liquor transactions to conform to state as well as triballaw.'I'I The
court rejected this argument, however, stating that Washington
placed too much emphasis on the isolated phrase "laws of the
state." If "laws of the state" implicitly permitted exclusive state
licensing and distribution jurisdiction, then the grammatical
logic of the statute would require the implicit inclusion of a similar jurisdictional component in the phrase "ordinance duly
adopted by the tribe." This construction would lead to the "unlikely result that a licensing and distribution monopoly could
vest in both the state and the tribes. "'18 The court noted that
grants of power to the state must be express, while tribal power
over internal affairs is inherent and exists without a grant from
Congress. The court concluded that it was more likely that Congress intended that the tribes have licensing and distribution
power, not the states.'19
The court then looked at the modifying clauses in section
1161.80 The phrase modifying "laws of the state" contained no
jurisdictional reference. On the other hand, "ordinance duly
adopted by the tribe" was followed by the phrase "having jurisdiction over such area of Indian country." The court noted that
Congress could have substituted the phrase "laws of the state
having jurisdiction" and could have deleted any reference to tribal jurisdiction to achieve a clearer result had it intended to
cQnfer jurisdiction to the states. On this basis, the court concluded that Congress only intended that the state function as a
source of law to be applied by the tribal government. 81
In support of this construction, the court compared the language of section 1161 with the Termination Acts8! and Public
75. [d.

76.
77.
78.
79.

[d. See supra text accompanying notes 46-50.
[d. at 1344. See supra note 9 for text of the statute.
[d.
[d.
80. [d. at 1345.

81. [d.

82. 25 U.S.C. § 726 (1976) states:
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Law 280,88 which were passed concurrently. Both statutes illustrated that Congress knew how to employ precise language to
transfer jurisdiction when it wished to use such language. The
court also examined the Assimilative Crimes Act8• and the Major Crimes Act,811 both of which employ language similar to section 1161. Both intended that state substantive law be incorporated into federal law. Federal courts, however, retained
jurisdiction over the crimes covered by the acts. 86
The court concluded that section 1161 was at best ambigu87
OUS.
Since ambiguities should be interpreted in favor of the
tribes,88 the court determined that there was insufficient evidence to show that Congress intended section 1161 to confer regulatory or licensing jurisdiction over on-reservation liquor traffic
to the states. 89
[A]ll statutes of the United States which affect Indians because of their status as Indians shall no longer be applicable to
the Alabama and Coushatta Tribes of Texas or the members
thereof, . . . and the laws of the several States shall apply to
the tribe and its members in the same manner as they apply
to other citizens or persons within their jurisdiction.
83. The most pervasive transfer of federal jurisdiction to the states was contained in
Public Law 280 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1360(a), 1162(a) (1976» which was enacted
during a period where Congress' policy was to terminate federal jurisdiction over the
tribes and to transfer responsibility to the states. The law granted civil and criminal
jurisdiction to certain voluntary states and permitted other states to assume jurisdiction
under certain conditions. In Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373 (1976), the Supreme
Court held that Public Law 280 granted states jurisdiction over civil causes of action,
that the primary intent of the law was to provide a judicial forum for disputes involving
Indians, and that the law did not confer upon the states the right to extend their regulatory power over Indian reservations. [d. at 384.
84. The Assimilative Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 13 (1976), provides that state substantive law be incorporated for prosecutions of offenses committed in federal jurisdictions.
The statute reads in pertinent part:
Whoever . . . is guilty of any act or omission which, although
not made punishable by any enactment of Congress, would be
punishable if committed or omitted within the jurisdiction of
the State, Territory, P088ession, or District in which such
place is situated, by the laws thereof in force at the time of
such act or omission, shall be guilty of a like offense and subject to a like punishment.
85. 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1976). Under this Act, the federal courts have jurisdiction over
certain crimes, but the laws of the state are incorporated for crimes (such as burglary
and incest) for which there are no federal counterparts.
86. 678 F.2d at 1347.
87. [d. at 1348.
88. [d. See McClanahan, 411 U.S. at 174.
89. 678 F.2d at 1348.
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The court finally noted that Congress did require that no
tribal ordinance be effective unless it was certified by the Secretary of the Interior. This indicated that the regulatory authority
of the tribes was to be safeguarded by federal supervision. Referring to the Supreme Court's analysis in Warren Trading Post
v. Arizona, the court reasoned that it was "presented with a congressional scheme in which comprehensive tribal ordinances and
Department of Interior certification procedures are 'in themselves sufficient to show that Congress has taken . . . business
. . . so fully in hand that no room remains for state laws imposing additional burdens . . . .' "90 These comprehensive schemes
and regulations were evidence that section 1161 preempts state
licensing and distribution jurisdicton.91
State Taxation of Liquor Sales to Non-tribal Members

Turning to the question of whether Washington could impose a sales tax on Indian liquor sales, the court noted that the
federal district court had issued its injunction against further
state seizures of liquor shipments without deciding the issue of
state taxes. 92 On appeal, Washington argued that Colville permitted state taxation of retail sales to non-tribal members.9s
The Rehner panel stated that Colville resolved two issues.
First, state taxation of sales to non-tribal Indians was neither
preempted by nor contrary to principles of tribal self-government. Second, a state's interest in enforcing its valid sales tax
was sufficient to justify seizure of cigarette shipments traveling
to the reservation if the tribes failed to comply with state collection procedures. 94 The Rehner court ruled that it was improper
for the district court to have granted an injunction without having first determining the validity of the tax. 90 Since Colville had
not been decided when the district court issued its decision, the
decision would be reversed and remanded for a hearing on the
validity of the tax. ge
90. Id. at 1349, quoting Warren Trading Post v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 380
U.S. 685, 689-91.
91. 678 F.2d at 1349.
92.Id.
93. 447 U.S. at 154-59.
94. 678 F.2d 1349-50.
95. Id. at 1349.
96. Id. The court noted that beyond reversing the district court's grant of perma-
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The Dissent
Judge Goodwin in his dissenting opinion stated that the result reached by the majority was equitable. s7 He concluded,
however, that the decision did not seem consistent with the text
of the law or its legislative history.s8 The dissent argued that
when the twenty-first amendment was passed, the regulatory interests of the states were protected. When Congress passed section 1161, it intended to give Indians parity with the rest of the
nation, but did not intend to confer greater rights upon the Indians. ss In monopoly states, Indians would have the freedom to
buy and import liquor at free market prices whereas other citizens would have to purchase liquor at government prices in government stores. IOO He concluded that while the majority's policy
favoring the Indians was correct, it was not supported by section
1161. Rather, it is Congress' task to change the law to conform
with this policy.lol
E.

ANALYSIS

The Ninth Circuit relied on a preemption analysis to find
that Congress had not granted regulatory authority to the states
through section 1161. The court reasoned that had Congress
wished to grant licensing and distribution "jurisdiction" to the
states, It could have expressly done so. While Washington and
California simply argued that "state laws" include all state laws,
both substantive and regulatory, the court, in a strained dissection of the statutory language, found that section 1161's reference to state law lacked a jurisdictional component. The court
nent injunctive relief, it would not rule on the merits of the following questions: (1)
whether Washington's sales tax on sales to non-tribal members, with or without credit
given to tribal sales taxes, is preempted or violative of tribal self-government; or, (2)
whether Washington may impose recordkeeping requirements upon the tribes pursuant
to the valid state taxing power. [d. In Part III of its opinion, the court rejected the
state's argument that the twenty-first amendment permits state liquor licensing on Indian reservations. [d. at 1350. In Part IV of the opinion, the court held that Washington's counterclaim was barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Section 1161 did
not subject the tribes to suits for declaratory or injunctive relief. The tribes, by suing for
injunctive relief, did not waive their sovereign immunity and consent to suit. A state
cannot compel a waiver of tribal sovereign immunity by simply seizing goods owned by
the tribes. [d. at 1351-52.
97. [d. at 1352.
98. [d.
99. [d.
100. [d.
101. [d.
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concluded that given this ambiguity, it would find in favor of the
tribes.
Basic to the court's analysis, however, was that the licensing
and monopoly laws were "regulatory" rather than substantive.
Washington contended that its liquor monopoly was a substantive standard of conduct designed to discourage liquor consumption. The court refused to address this issue because Washington
had failed to raise it at trial. Therefore, the .court gave no guidelines to resolve cases where a state asserts its power as a substantive standard of conduct.
It would have been helpful had the court distinguished between policy and devices to implement policy. Thus, while the
states could formulate policy that governs the nature and extent
of liquor transactions, the tribes would be vested with the authority to implement that policy. As devices to implement policy, licensing and monopoly laws would be attributes of Indian
self-government.

By relying on a preemption analysis, the court did not have
to reach the issue of infringement of tribal powers which is in
itself a bar to the application of state law. The court found it
unnecessary to determine whether inherent tribal sovereignty independently excludes state licensing and monopoly laws. 102 The
Supreme Court in White Mountain Apache Tribe u. Bracker
noted that the right of "tribal self-government is ultimately dependent on and subject to the broad power of Congress. "103 The
Court had already ruled in United States u. Mazurie that Congress had delegated its plenary power of Indian country liquor
transactions to the tribes. 104 Given the assertion of that power
by the Muckleshoot and Tulalip tribes to regulate and tax liquor
transactions,lOG a clear conflict between state and tribal interests
existed. McClanahan could have been invoked to hold state law
inapplicable because the "point where tribal interests are affected" had been reached. The Muckleshoot and Tulalip ordinances, moreover, expressly stated that only state substantive
standards would apply. State assertions of regulatory laws would
102.
103.
104.
105.

678
448
419
See

F.2d at 1352.
U.S. at 143.
U.S. at 554.
supra note 15.
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be in conflict with the tribes' express desire not to have those
laws apply. Once the conflict appears, state law should defer to
tribal law.
The Ninth Circuit may have had another motive in relying
on preemption principles. In White Mountain Apache Tribe l06
and Central Machinery CO.,IO'7 the Supreme Court invalidated
taxes on non-Indian businesses because they engaged in activities on the reservation which were heavily regulated by federal
law. Moreover, the Colville Court, citing United States v.
Mazurie,108 admitted that a tribe may preempt a state's power
to tax by a properly delegated power to do so. In Mazurie, the
Court found that Congress had delegated a portion of its plenary
power over Indian liquor transactions to the tribes. loe By finding
that Indian liquor transactions were subject to comprehensive
tribal schemes and federal regulation which preempted intrusion
by state licensing and distribution laws, the district court would
be left with no choice but to make a similar finding with respect
to state taxation.
Left unstated by most of the decisions on licensing and taxation are the financial consequences of a decision in favor of the
tribes or states. Licensing and monopoly schemes, as well as taxation, serve as sources of revenues for the states. A finding in
favor of the tribes might lead to a significant reduction of revenues to the states if the tribes were able to sell at lower than
market prices. This was certainly the concern of the Supreme
Court in Moe and Colville. On the other hand, a finding in favor
of the state would, as the majority pointed out in White Mountain, deprive the Indian tribes of a valuable source of revenue
and defeat Congress' policy of tribal self-determinaton and commercial development. 110
While the Ninth Circuit did not explicitly weigh these underlying considerations, the result it reached is correct since, as
the Court noted in White Mountain, "traditional notions of Indian self government are so deeply ingrained in our jurispru106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

448 U.S. at
[d. at 165.
447 U.S. at
419 U.S. at
448 U.S. at

150.
156.
554.
143.
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dence that they have provided an important 'backdrop' against
which vague or ambiguous federal enactments must always be
measured. "l11
May Lee Tong·

OTHER DEVELOPMENTS IN INDIAN LAW

A.

SOVEREIGN POWER TO IMPOSE CIVIL REGULATIONS ON NON-INDIANS WITHIN THE RESERVATION

In Cardin v. De La Cruz, 1 the Ninth Circuit held that an
Indian tribe had "inherent sovereign power" to impose its building, health and safety regulations over a non-Indian's business
within the reservation.1II In addition, the Ninth Circuit determined that jurisdiction to decide such an issue was clearly a federal question because the action was based on "federal common
law."s
The district court had enjoined the tribe from enforcing its
building, health and safety regulations against the plaintiff,· relying on the Supreme Court decision of Oliphant v. Suquamish. II
In reversing, the Ninth Circuit disapproved of the lower court's
broad reading of Oliphant. 8
111. [d.
• Third year student, Golden Gate University School of Law.

1. 671 F.2d 363 (9th Cir. 1982) (per Pregerson, J.; the other panel members were
Poole, J. and Kellam, D.J., sitting by designation), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 293 (1982).
2. 671 F.2d at 364.
3. [d. at 365. The "federal common law" referred to results from principles not
found in any "specific statute or treaty" and therefore falls within the federal-question
jurisdiction of 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1976). [d. See also Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406
U.S. 91, 100 (1972).
4. Plaintiff, a non-Indian, owns a grocery store within the Quinault Indian Reservation. The tribe met with him when he purchased the store to discuss measures to correct
alleged dangerous and unsanitary conditions. The plaintiff failed to remedy the alleged
defects before opening the store and the tribe obtained an injunction from the tribal
court closing the store. The plaintiff filed this action in the district court to enjoin the
tribe from regulating his business. 671 F.2d at 364-65.
5. 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
6. 671 F.2d at 365-66.
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The plaintiff argued that: (1) the federal courts had jurisdiction pursuant to statute,7 (2) tribal power to regulate non-Indians within the reservation was controlled by Oliphant, and, (3)
regulation of non-Indians within the reservation could only be
the result of a consensual relationship when the activity being
regulated is one that has a "direct effect on the health or welfare
of the tribe."8 The defendants argued that jurisdiction of the
matter fell within the inherent sovereign power of the tribe and
that the recent Supreme Court decision, Montana v. United
)
States, 9 was controlling.
In a brief decision, the Ninth Circuit upheld the tribe's
power to enforce its regulations based upon the Montana guidelines. After citing a series of High Court cases in support of tribal sovereign powers/o the Cardin court held that the "[t]ribe's
exercise of civil jurisdiction . . . belongs to both of the broad
categories" defined in Montana.ll In essence the appellate court
was persuaded that the tribe was regulating an activity that
"threatens or has some effect on. . . the health or welfare of the
tribe."12
The Ninth Circuit emphasized that Oliphant concerned
only the criminal jurisdiction of tribal courts, and had no effect
on Indian civil or regulatory jurisdiction over non-Indians. IS The
panel stated that any other reading of Oliphant would "reduce
to a nullity the Supreme Court's repeated assertions that Indian
tribes retain attributes of sovereignty over their territory, not
7. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (Supp. 1982) provides in part that jurisdiction is granted to the
district courts over "civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the
United States."
8. 671 F.2d at 366.
9. 450 U.S. 544, reh'g denied, 452 U.S. 9ll (1981). The plaintiff also asserted that
the General Allotment Act of 1887, ch. ll9, 24 Stat. 388, had impliedly withdrawn tribal
jurisdiction. This was rejected without much discussion by the Cardin court. 671 F.2d at
367 n.5, citing Buster v. Wright, 135 F. 947, 952 (8th Cir. 1905), appeal dismissed, 203
U.S. 599.
10. Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 102 S.Ct. 894 (1982) (tribal severance tax imposed on oil and gas extracted by non-Indians from leased reservation land); Washington
v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134 (1980) (power to
tax non-Indian purchasers of goods on reservation); Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959)
(exclusive jurisdiction of tribal courts over civil suits by a non-Indian against reservation
arising out of transaction on reservation).
ll. 671 F.2d at 366.
12. [d., quoting Montana, supra note 9, at 566.
13. 671 F.2d at 365.
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just their members.IIl4
In dicta, the Ninth Circuit addressed the plaintiff's argument that a "consensual relationship" and "direct effect on ...
the health or welfare of the tribe" are necessary to regulate nonIndians within the reservation. The Cardin court found that because the regulation of plaintiff's business was" 'an exercise of
legitimate sovereign authority,' it cannot be overturned because
of [plaintiff's] non-consent."l11 However, the Montana guidelines, relied upon by the Ninth Circuit, define a legitimate sovereign power as one which results from the existence of a "consensual relationship."lo
Apparently the Ninth Circuit was persuaded that a consensual relationship did in fact exist or was not relevant to the decision because the other criteria evidencing a "legitimate sovereign
authority" were present. l'7 In any event the panel rejected the
argument that both criteria need be present simultaneously.
Thus, in the Ninth Circuit, Indian tribes retain the power to
impose civil regulations on the activities of a non-Indian on fee
lands within the reservation. This decision is a further step in
the progression of cases giving tribes "civil and regulatory jurisdiction over non-Indians ll18 within tribal lands.
B.

IMPLICIT RECOGNITION OF EXPANDED CRIMINAL JURISDICTION

In United States u. Bowman,19 the Ninth Circuit held that
an Indian charged with an enumerated crime under the Major
Crimes Act of 188520 could be convicted of and sentenced to a
lesser included offense. n Defendant, an Indian, was charged
14. [d. at 366.

15. 671 F.2d at 367. See also Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe. 102 S. Ct. 894
(1982).
16. 671 F.2d at 366.
17. [d. at 367. The other criterion found in the Montana decision is that the exercise of "civil authority ... threatens or has some direct effect on the ... health or
welfare of the tribe." 450 U.S. 544. 566.
18. See supra text accompanying note 11.
19. 679 F.2d 798 (9th Cir. 1982) (per Schroeder. J.; the other panel members were
Wallace. J .• and Henderson. D.J.• sitting by designation. dissenting) (rehearing and rehearing en banc denied. Aug. 13. 1982).
20. 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1977).
21. The same result was reached in United States v. John. 587 F.2d 683 (5th Cir.
1979) and United States v. Felicia. 495 F.2d 353 (8th Cir.). cert. denied, 419 U.S. 849
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with assault resulting in serious bodily injury, one of the crimes
specifically enumerated in the Major Crimes Act. 22 At trial, defendant requested and received a jury instruction on the lesser
included offense of assault by striking, beating or wounding. 23
The jury found the defendant guilty of the lesser offense whereupon he appealed, contending the court lacked jurisdiction to
sentence him on any crime not enumerated in section 1153. u
The Bowman court affirmed the lower court's determination
that jurisdiction was present. The Ninth Circuit relied on the
Supreme Court's holding in Keeble v. United States 2G that an
Indian defendant is entitled to an instruction for a lesser included offense. 26 The Keeble Court, however, did not reach the
question of whether the trial court had the power to sentence
the defendant on the lesser included offense.
In Bowman, the Ninth Circuit argued that the Keeble Court
had implicitly decided the issue of jurisdiction and the lower
court's power to sentence a defendant on the lesser offense. The
trial court in Keeble did not give the requested instruction because it believed it had no jurisdiction to do so. Therefore, in
reversing the trial court, the Keeble Court was implicitly holding
that the jurisdiction to give the instruction was present and that
the lower court had the power to sentence a defendant on such a
charge. 27
The Bowman court found that the Supreme Court's emphasis on the desire for "parity of treatment"28 of all criminal defendants in federal courts was compelling even in light of the fear
that the holding would extend the reach of the Major Crimes
Act. 29 The Ninth Circuit referred to the possible abuses related
(1974).
22. The Major Crimes Act specifically enumerates several of the more serious crimes
that come within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States. The Indians retain jurisdiction over the lesser offenses included within the enumerated crimes.
23. FED. R. CRIM. P. 31(c) provides: "The defendant may be found guilty of an offense necessarily included in the offense charged or of an attempt to commit either the
offense charged or an offense necessarily included therein if the attempt is an offense."
24. 679 F.2d at 799.
25. 412 U.S. 205 (1973).
26. [d. at 214.
27. 679 F.2d at 799.
28. [d. at 800.
29. [d.
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to the inclusion of lesser offense instructions under section 1153:
the overcharging of a defendant to gain a conviction on a lesser
offense. However, the facts of Bowman did not present this issue. The Bowman court also cited dicta from Keeble to support
its limited consideration of the mutuality question. 30 The majority in Bowman concluded by reluctantly adhering to the Keeble
rule while noting the difficulty of reconciling the rule with the
history of section 1153 and "the congressional intent to confer
only limited jurisdiction."31
The dissent in Bowman stressed that the majority's reliance
on Keeble was a departure from the established jurisdictional
structure of Indian criminallaw. 32 The dissent argued that Keeble was only a determination of "procedural rights to which Indian defendants are entitled in federal court."33 More importantly, the result of the holding in Bowman would be to deprive
"the tribal courts of exclusive jurisdiction by implication . . .
."34 The essence of the dissent's objection was that exclusive tribal jurisdiction can be extinguished only by an act of Congress
and not by implication. 311
Bowman represents another inroad into the area of tribal
jurisdiction. Most importantly, the route taken by the Ninth
Circuit, the implicit recognition of expanded jurisdiction, is a
shortcut clearly threatening the diminishing powers of tribal
courts.

30. [d., citing Keeble, 412 U.S. at 214 n.14. See also United States v. Whitaker, 447
F.2d 314, 321 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
31. 679 F.2d at 800.
32. [d. at 801.
33. [d.
34. [d. at 802.
35. [d. at 803.
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